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economy be served by deciding the dispute
in the context of this action, since the
present dispute is separate and distinct
from the dispute underlying the original
action.
Accordingly, defendants' motion for an
order enforcing the settlement agreement is
denied. Defendants must institute a sepa-
rate action to obtain the relief they seek.




Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District, Colorado Water Congress, Na-
tional Water Resources Association,
Cache La Poudre Water Users Associa-
tion, Lower South Platte Water Con-
servancy District, Southwestern Water
Conservation District, and State of Colo-
rado, Plaintiff-Intervenors,
RIVERSIDE IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
and Public Service Company of
Colorado, Plaintiffs,
DIST. v. ANDREWS	 583
Sapp. 5113 (1M)
trict Court for the District of Colorado,
Kane, J., denying federal government's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pro-
ceedings challenging decision of Army
Corps of Engineers that dam developers
were not entitled to nationwide temporary
permit to discharge sand and gravel during
course of dam construction. The Court of
Appeals, Seth, Chief Judge, 658 F.2d 762,
affirmed. On remand, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado,
Kane, J., held that: (1) Army Corps
district engineer properly exercised his
federal police power under the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act
in denying dam developers a nationwide
temporary permit to discharge sand and
gravel during course of construction of
dam, based upon perceived adverse impact
of dam's operation on whooping crane crit-
ical habitat; (2) policy statement in the
Clean Water Act did not evince congres-
sional intent to limit scope of section of the
Act relating to issuance of permits for dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into navi-
gable waters; and (3) mere fact of Con-
gress' approval of interstate compact relat-
ing to certain navigable waterway did not
limit congressional authority to thereafter
enact the Clean Water Act, even though the
Act affected state water rights in manner
inconsistent with the compact.
Complaint dismissed; judgment for de-
fendant.
V.
Colonel William It. ANDREWS, Jr., in his
official capacity as District Engineer of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Oma-
ha District, Defendant,
and
National Wildlife Federation,	 1. Navigable Waters 4a2
Defendant-Intervenor.	 Waters and Water Courses 4=2
Civ. A. Na 80-K-624.	 There are only two classes of special
United States District Court,
D. Colorado.
	 federal water rights: reserved rights and
navigation-servitude rights.
July 31, 1983.	 2. Game 4=,31/2
Army Corps district engineer properly
Interlocutory appeal was taken from exercised his federal police power under the
lodgment entered by the United States Dis- Clean Water Act and the Endangered Spe-
doh m an independent, plenary action. See	 556. 558-59 (1979); Yonkers Fur Dressing Co.
Tatelbaum Holdings, Ltd. v. Gold, 48 N.Y.2d
	
v. Royal Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 435, 160 N.E. 77851 • 56, 396 N.E2d 1029, 1031, 421 N.Y.S.2d
	
(1928).
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des Act in denying earth-fill dam develop-
ers a nationwide temporary permit to dis-
charge sand and gravel during course of
construction of dam on tributary of naviga-
ble river, based upon perceived adverse im-
pact of dam's operation on whooping crane
critical habitat some 250 to 300 miles down-
stream; engineer's decision was not limited
to consideration of water quality, but ex-
tended to changes in water quantity as
well. Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, § 404, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1344; Endangered Species Act of 1973,
§§ 2 et seq., 7(a)(2), as amended, 16 U.S.
CA. §§ 1531 et seq., 1536(0(2).
3. Health and Environment 4:1125.7(4)
Notwithstanding congressional policy
statement in the Clean Water Act, to effect
that, inter alia, authority of each state to
allocate quantities of water within its juris-
diction shall not be superseded, abrogated,
or otherwise impaired by the Act, there was
no intent to limit scope of section of the Act
relating to issuance of permits for discharge
of dredged or fill material into navigable
waters. Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, §§ 101(g), 404,
510(2), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251(g), 1344,
1370(2).
4. States 40. 6
While it is true that Congress cannot
unilaterally reserve right to amend or re-
peal an interstate compact, approving of a
compact does not limit Congress' authority
later to enact federal laws.
5. States =6
Mere fact of Congress' approval of in-
terstate compact relating to certain naviga-
ble waterway did not limit congressional
authority to thereafter enact the Clean
Water Act, even though the Act affected
state water rithts in manner inconsistent
with the compact. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 101 et
seq., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq.
James R. McCotter, Timothy 3. Flanagan,
Kelly, Stansfield & O'Donnell, Denver,
Colo., for plaintiffs.
John Hill, Jr., Dept. of Justice, Land &
Natural Resources Div., Denver, Colo., Fred
R. Disheroon, Dept of Justice, Land & Nat-
ural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., Rob-
ert N. Miller, U.S. Atty., Richard A. Jost,
Asst. U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., Margot Zal-
len, Office of Regional Sol., Dept. of Interi-
or, Denver, Colo., Michael Reilly, Asst. Dist.
Counsel, Omaha Dist., U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Omaha, Neb., for defendant An-
drews.
Frank E. Maynes, Maynes, Bradford &
Shipps, Durango, Colo., for Southwestern
Water Conservation Dist.
Donald H. Hamburg, General Counsel,
Glenwood Springs, Colo., for Colorado River
Water Conserv. Dist.
Ward H. Fischer, James Ringenberg,
Fort Collins, Colo., for Cache La Poudre
Water Users Ass'n.
Kirk B. Holleyman, Aspen, Colo., for
Lower South Platte Water Conservancy
Dist.
Wendy Weiss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver,
Colo., for State of Colo.
John M. Sayre, Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr.,
Jeffrey C. Fereday, Davis, Graham &
Stubbs, Denver, Colo., for Northern Cob.
Water Conservancy Dist.
Robert J. Gotten, Boulder, Colo., for Na-
tional Wildlife Federation.
Steven D. Ellis, Mountain States Legal
Foundation, Denver, Colo., for Colo. Water
Congress and National Water Resources As-
sociation.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KANE, District Judge.
This case involves the plaintiffs' construc-
tion of an earth-fill darn on Wildcat Creek
in Colorado. Wildcat Creek is a tribute!,
of the South Platte River, which is a tribu-
tary of the Missouri River, a navigable
water of the United States. Because thy
construction of the dam involves the place-
ment of fill material into a tributary of
navigable waters of the United States.
§ 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.0
§ 1344, applies.
RIVERSIDE IRR. DIST. v. ANDREWS
ate as Its F.Supp. 583 (1M)
An interlocutory appeal was taken from
my decision denying the government's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
These proceedings challenge the decision of
the Army Corps' Engineer that the dam
developers are not entitled to a nationwide
temporary permit to discharge sand and
gravel during the course of dam construc-
tion on a tributary of the South Platte
River in Morgan County, Colorado. The
Court of Appeals held that the decision of
the Army Corps of Engineers that the dam
developers were not entitled to the nation-
wide permit to discharge sand and gravel
during the course of construction under na-
tionwide permit regulations was reviewa-
ble. A nationwide permit is one covering a
category of activities occurring throughout
the country which involve discharges of
dredged or fill material which will cause
only minimal adverse effects on the envi-
ronment when performed separately and
which will have only minimal cumulative
effects. Such a permit is automatic in that
if one qualifies, no application is needed nor
must notice be given before beginning the
discharge activity.
As the Court of Appeals stated:
The basic consideration is Section 404
of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.
§ 1344) and the regulations issued under
its authority. The regulations concerned,
83 C.F.R. § 323.4-2, relate to work on the
site during the course of construction of
the dam, and more particularly to the
placement of fill material (discharge of
fill material) during construction. As in-
dicated above, the regulations provide for
automatic authority to place fill material
if certain conditions are met. The regu-
lations do not expressly prtnride that the
Engineer is the one to decide whether the
conditions are met and that automatic
(nationwide) authority thereby exists. In
any event, the Engineer did make such a
determination. He decided and advised
the plaintiffs that they did not qualify
torn automatic permit He reached a
decision and officially advised the plain-
tiffs. His letter to the parties was as
follows:
"Dear Mr. Douglas:
"Reference is made to our previous meet-
ings and discussions regarding the Na-
tionwide Section 404 permit for the Wild-
cat Creek Dam project.
"Since operation of the proposed reser-
voir could have an adverse impact on an
endangered species (whooping crane), by
letter dated 15 September 1978 my prede-
cessor, Colonel James W. Ray, entered
into consultation with the US Fish and
Wildlife Service.
"Inclosed is a copy of the biological opin-
ion for the project which indicates that
the operation of the reservoir is likely to
jeopardize continued existence of the
whooping crane and adversely modify a
53-mile reach of the Platte River which is
critical habitat for the crane. According-
ly, construction of the proposed dam does
not qualify for 'Nationwide' authorization
within the meaning of 33 C.F.R. 323.4—
2(aX1) unless you exercise one of the two
alternatives outlined in the biological
opinion.
"Should you elect to proceed with con-
struction of the dam, an individual Ix rmit
processed through the full public interest
review will be required." Riverside Irri-
gation District v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 at
765-66.
It is thus clear that the Engineer did not
base his decision on the issue of whether the
placement of fill material during the con-
struction of the dam would have an adverse
effect on the environment but rather on
whether the operation of the dam and the
altered water flow would have an adverse
impact on an endangered species whose
critical habitat exists some 250 to 300 miles
downstream. Both the Court of Appeals
and the parties before me have assumed
without contest that no problems would
arise during construction. Virtually no one
asserts that the construction work itself
will in any way effect the crane habitat.
Thus, the issue is whether the Engineer has
exceeded his statutory authority. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to me
"... for a determination whether the Engi-
neer acted within his authority and to re-
solve whatever issues may remain."
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A new twist has been added to this case
since the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
The Corps of Engineers, through Colonel
Andrews who is Colonel Stipo's successor in
office and in this litigation, has now at-
tempted to require plaintiffs to apply for an
individual permit pursuant to 33 C.F.R.
§ 823.4-4. A new and more detailed bio-
logical opinion was received in April 1982.
Relying on that opinion and this other regu-
lation, Colonel Andrews sent a letter in
June 1982 ordering the plaintiffs to file for
the individual permit. Moreover, Andrews
contends that this act cannot be reviewed
by the courts because 5 U.S.C. § 701(aX2)
precludes review when "agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."
Andrews acknowledges that this is a very
narrow exception, but argues that in this
instance he acted affirmatively to carry out
his obligation under a clear mandate of the
Endangered Species Act. lie assarts that
the only limit on his authority under 33
C.F.R. § 323.4-4 is that exercise of authori-
ty must be based on the concerns of the
aquatic environment Therefore, he urges,
there is no legal standard for the court to
apply. He further asserts that the case is
now moot.
The plaintiffs argue that the issue was,
and still is, whether defendant has exceeded
his authority under § 404 of the Clean
Water Act by considering the downstream
effects of the reduced flow on the whooping
crane habitat in Nebraska. The case still
boils down, they say, to a question of
whether the defendant can consider quanti-
ty or just quality of the water and, conse-
quently, whether the investigation can in-
clude the effects of continuing operation
within the ambit of the statutory mandate
to consider the construction itself. Plain-
tiffs•contend, and I agree, that when con-
gnu enacted the Clean Water Act, it did
not intend to cut off judicial review.
Plaintiffs urge that even if their analysis
is restricted to the issues as characterized
by the defendant, the decision is still sub-
ject to review. The defendant states in his
brief that 33 C.F.R. § 3234-2 embodies
"Congressional limitations on his discretion-
ary authority under Section 404(eX1)," that
33 C.F.R. § 323.4-4 limits authority to con-
cerns based on the aquatic environment,
and that individual permits may be required
"in appropriate cases." Plaintiffs rejoin
that this authority allows for review under
5 § 706(2XA) in order to determine
whether the Corps' action is "not in accord-
ance with law."
In supplements and amendments to the
complaint which I authorized from the
bench, plaintiffs also address a few other
issues. First they suggest that 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.4-4 is inconsistent with the governing
statute, § 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1344, and should therefore be in-
validated. Second, they contend that de-
fendants should be estopped from exercis-
ing any authority conferred by § 323.4-4
because plaintiffs relied to their detriment
on "misrepresentations" that this litigation
would be settled on the basis of whether
they qualified for a nationwide permit. Fi-
nally, they argue that § 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 should
not apply to this action since the construc-
tion is privately funded. By reading the
plain language of the statute, however, it is
clear that the statute encompasses any ac-
tion authorized by any federal agency in
addition to any action funded or carried out
by the agency.
Given the mandate of the Court of Ap-
peals, I am not impressed with the defend-
ant's mootness argument. Upon the filing
of this case, the matters raised in the com-
plaint become sub judice and cannot be
rendered moot by the ex parte action of thi
defendant. If, indeed, the defendant
wishes to restrain me from deciding this
case, he must address the mandate issued
by the Court of Appeals, the authority of
which, certainly exceeds that of the defend-
ant.
[1] There are only two classes of sound
federal water rights: reserved rights, see. .
e.g., New Mexico v. United States, 438 I. S
696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed2d 1052 (197st
United States v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 123, 96
S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976), and nr-
gation-servitude rights, see, e.g., Caged
RIVERSIDE IRE. DIST. v. ANDREWS	 587
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Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 15 L.Ed.
435 (1856).
States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690, 19 S.Ct. 770,43 L.Ed. 1136 (1899).
Neither of these is involved in this case.
The plaintiffs attempt to characterize the
defendant's actions as an attempt to create
a third class of federal water rights, su-
perseding Colorado water law and the
South Platte Compact, 44 Stat 195 (1928).
The Tenth Circuit also apparently viewed
the issue in this manner in its opinion:
No one in these proceedings asserts that
the construction work on the dam nor the
placement of fill material will in any way
affect the crane habitat
658 F2d at 767.
Thus again the issue is reduced to the
Engineer's statutory authority to control
of the quantity of water released. Thus
there is for all practical purposes nothing
else.
658 F24 at 768.
Following this characterization, the plain-
tiffs correctly point out that congress has
had a long-standing deference to state
water law, see, e.g., California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57
LEd.2d 1018 (1978), and that the Clean
Water Act does not evidence a contrary
intent in this case Basically, they make
these arguments:
1. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act is
only directed at water-quality changes
caused by the discharge of fill materials,
and therefore does not apply to changes in
water quantity caused by such discharge:
a Section 101(g) of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g), demonstrates con-
gress's intent not to affect in any substan-
tial manner state water rights:
• 8• Congress could not affect state water
rights in any manner inconsistent with the
South Platte Compact 6
Although these arguments have a super-
ficial appeal, a more-careful analysis re-
sts that all are without merit. The first
dearly contrary to all of the applicable
rime law. The second is contrary to
51((2) of the Clean Water Act, 32 U.S.C.
I 1370(2). Finally, the third is refuted by
hansylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont
F Sup —13
Rather than characterize the defendant's
actions as the creation of a new class of
federal water rights, a better approach is to
determine whether his actions were a prop-
er exercise of a federal police power.
Because the plaintiffs do not dispute that
the Clean Water Act was a proper exercise
of congress's constitutional authority, the
only question in this case is whether the
defendant's actions were proper under the
Clean Water Act. Analysis should there-
fore focus on the scope of the defendant's
authority under the Clean Water Act, rath-
er than on an emotional flummery of states'
rights. Although the defendant's actions
may have a substantial effect on state
water rights, such is the case with many
federal laws which particularly preempt
state water laws. For example, a congres-
sional designation of a river as wild or
scenic under the Wild and Scenic Riven
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-17, will bar most
dams and other diversion works from being
constructed on the designated section, often
limiting the exercise of state water rights.
Yet this act has not been successfully chal-
lenged as an improper intrusion on state
water rights.
1. Scope of defendant's authority and
obligations under § 404
[2] Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(0(2), pro-
vides, in relevant part:
Each Federal agency shall, in consulta-
tion with and with the assistance of the
Secretary [of the Interior], insure that
any action authorized, ... by such agen-
cy . . . is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered
species ... or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secre-
tary, ..., to be critical.
In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 158, 178, 98 S.Ct.
2279, 2291, 57 L.Ed24 117 (1978), the court
stated:
One would be hard pressed to find a
statutory provision whose terms were any
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plainer than those in § 7 of the Endan-
gered Species Act. Its very words af-
firmatively command all federal agencies
't0 insure that actions authorized, funded,
or carried out by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence of an endangered
species ...'	 [Emphasis added.]
This language admits of no exception.,
While the Endangered Species Act does
not expand the scope of federal agencies'
authority, its clear language "shall insure"
directs them to exercise their authority un-
der other statutes to the fullest extent pos-
sible to carry out its aims. The question in
this case is therefore whether the defend-
ant's actions here, denial of plaintiffs' use
of the nationwide permit because of poten-
tial deleterious downstream effects, was
permissible under the Clean Water Act. If
defendant's action was permissible under
the Clean Water Act, then it was required
under the Endangered Species Act
Both parties spend considerable effort
trying to distinguish between "direct" and
"indirect" and between "primary" and "sec-
ondary" effects caused by the plaintiffs'
project. Obviously it is usually not possible
to draw a definite line between these dif-
ferent types of efforts. The case law, how-
ever, is clear that federal agencies are to
consider many potential effects from a
project on an endangered species. For ex-
ample, in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct.
2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978), the court held
that the defendant federal agency had to
consider the effects caused by water that
would back up from its dam, not just the
direct physical impacts of the dam. In
NWF v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 373 (5th
Cir.1976), rehearing denied, 532 F.2d 1375,
cert. denied under Boteler v. NWF, 429 U.S.
979, 97 S.Ct. 489, 50 L.Ed.2d 587 (1976), the
court reversed a trial court dismissal of an
environmental group's complaint that a pro-
posed highway would damage an endan-
gered specie's habitat:
I. Since this opinion congress amended
7(a)(2), changing "does not jeopardize" to "is
not likely to jeopardize." While this amend-
ment might change a federal agency's (and this
court's) factual review standards, it does not
change the inquiry in this case because no facts
Although it is clear that the crane can
survive the direct loss of 300 acres of
habitat, the evidence, ... shows that it is
questionable whether the crane can sur-
vive the additional loss of habitat caused
by the indirect effects of the highway,
coupled with the excavation of and drain-
age caused by borrow pits.
Principal among the indirect effects of
the highway on the crane is the residen-
tial and commercial development that can
be expected to result from the construc-
tion of the highway.
This is consistent with North Slope Borough
v. Andrus, 642 F2d 589, 608 (D.C.Cir.1980),
where the appellate court adopted the dis-
trict court's holding that, under the Endan-
gered Species Act, caution can only be exer-
cised if the agency takes a look at all the
possible ramifications of the agency action.
To the extent authorized by the Clean
Water Act, the defendant therefore is re-
quired to consider indirect effects of the
dams on the whoopers and their habitat
Several courts have held that the Clean
Water Act should be construed broadly to
encompass deleterious environmental ef-
fects of projects. For example, in Minneh-
aha Creek Watershed That. v. Hoffman, 597
F.2d 617, 625-26 (8th Cir.1979), the court
held that § 404 extended beyond adverse
water-quality effects of projects to include
potential physical effects on navigable
waters caused by the discharge of chemical-
ly benign fill material.
Two district courts have held that the
depletion of water, off of the project's site,
is an effect that must be considered in
determining whether to allow the project
under § 404 of the Clean Water Act In
United States v. Fleming Plantations, 12
ERC 1705, 1709 (E.11La.1978), the court
granted the plaintiff's application for an
injunction barring the defendants' construc-
tion of a levee that would have caused a
tract of wetlands to dry up. In Nebraska v.
are in dispute. If there is actually a disPule
the actual effect that the dam will cause on the
whooper habitat, that will have to be resolved
through the individual permit process under
404(a); the nationwide permit does not pro-
vide for such a factual inquiry.
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First, congressional policy statements "can-
not nullify a clear and specific grant of
jurisdiction, even if the particular grant
seems inconsistent with the broadly stated
purpose." Connecticut Light & Power Ca
v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U.S. 515,
527, 65 S.Ct. 749, 754, 89 Ltd. 1150 (1945).
Here § 510(2) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1370(2), which is not a policy statement,
provides,
Except as expressly provided in this chap-
ter, nothing shall ... be construed as
impairing or in any manner affecting any
right of jurisdiction of the States with
respect to the waters ... of such States.
[Emphasis added.]
REA, 12 ERC 1156, 1171-73 (D.Neb.1978),
the court held that a federal agency spon-
soring a dam in Wyoming and the Army
Corps of Engineers were both obligated to
insure that the dam's construction would
not jeopardize the whoopers' habitat down-
stream in Nebraska. The court invalidated
an individual § 404 permit for the dam
because these agencies had not made the
necessary assurances.
Because the Clean Water Act allows fed-
eral agencies to consider deleterious down-
stream environmental effects from a
project and because the Endangered Species
Act requires federal agencies to take what-
ever measures are necessary, within their
authority, to protect an endangered species
and its habitat, the defendant in the
present case was required to halt the plain-
tiffs from proceeding under the nationwide
permit when their project had the potential
of adversely affecting the whoopers and
their habitat downstream from the project?
2. Effect of § 101(g) of the Clean Water
Act
[3] Section 101(g) of the Clean Water
Act, 33	 § 1251(g), provides:
It is the policy of Congress that the au-
thority of each State to allocate quanti-
ties of water within its jurisdiction shall
not be superseded, abrogated, or other-
wise impaired by this chapter. It is the
further policy of Congress that nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to super-
sede or abrogate rights to quantities of
water which have been established by any
State. Federal agencies shall cooperate
with State and local agencies to develop
comprehensive solutions to prevent, re-
duce and eliminate pollution in concert
with programs from managing water re-
sources.
The plaintiffs argue that this section dem-
omtrates that congress intended not to in-
terfere with state water rights and inter-
state water compacts in enacting the Clean
Water Act While this argument is appeal-
ing, especially in light of the strong lan-
guage of § 101(g), it should be rejected.
2. See Bayou des Families Div. v. U.S. Corps of
Because both the statements of § 101(es
sponsor and the relevant committee report
state that § 101(g) was not intended to
change existing law, including § 510(2),
congress did not intend to limit § 404's
scope where it might affect state water-
rights law when it enacted § 101(g).
The plaintiffs' argument is further dimin-
ished because the defendant's actions did
not abrogate or supersede any state water
rights As discussed above, the defendant
only placed conditions on the construction
of the dam that might affect the plaintiffs'
water rights. While the defendant is bar-
ring the plaintiffs from exercising their
water rights in a manner inconsistent with
federal law, he is not taking away the
rights. They may still be utilized, so long
as in a manner consistent with federal law.
3. Applicability of the South Platte
Compact
[4, 5] The plaintiffs' final argument is
that the defendant's action was improper
because of the South Platte Compact, 44
Stat 195 (1928). They argue that congress
could not pass a clean water act that would
impair this previously approved compact.
This argument should be rejected. It is
true that congress cannot unilaterally re-
serve the right to amend or repeal an inter-
state compact. Tobin v. United States, 306
F.2d 270, 273 (D.C.Cir.1962). This does not
Engineers. 541 F.Supp. 1025 (1982).
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mean, however, that approving a compact
limits congress's authority later to enact
federal laws. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling,
supra, the court held:
The question here is, whether or not the
compact can operate as a restriction upon
the power of congress under the constitu-
tion to regulate commerce among the
several states? Clearly not. Otherwise
congress and two States would possess
the power to modify and alter the consti-
tution itself.
A subsequent federal law of nationwide
applicability will therefore be enforceable
even if it affects a prior compact. Congress
therefore did not limit its authority to enact
the Clean Water Act when it approved the
South Platte Compact.
CONCLUSION
Resolution of this case depends largely on
its characterization. If the case is charac-
terized as an attempt by the defendant to
condemn the plaintiffs' Colorado water
rights, then the plaintiffs' should obviously
prevail. On the other hand, if the case is
characterized as an attempt by the defend-
ant to exercise federal police power in a
manner required by federal statutes, then
the defendant should prevail, even if his
actions affect the plaintiffs' exercise of
their water rights. For the reasons set out
above, I believe that the latter characteriza-
tion is preferable, and that the defendant's
actions were a proper exercise of federal
police power, even though they will clearly
affect the plaintiffs' exercise of their water
rights. I must limit my decision to the
propriety of the exercise of such power.
Whether it is prudent to vest such power is
a political question which must be ad-
dressed to congress not the courts.
In accordance with the mandate of the
Court of Appeals, I holdsthat the Engineer
acted within his authority.
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs com-
plaint is hereby dismissed. Judgment shall
enter for defendant. Each party to bear
his own costs.
Thomas A. FISKE, Alison Beckley, Rosh-
anda Blackwell, Garrett D. Brown, Mil-
ton T. Chet, Judith A. Conn, Christo-
pher P. Hoeppner, Andree S. Kahlmor-
ran, Robert R. Lutton, Jeffrey L Mar-
tin, Michael Pennock, Jeffrey E. Rogers,
Jean R. Savage, Sally L Thorsen and
Gregory J. Zensen, Plaintiffs,
V.
LOCKHEED-GEORGIA COMPANY, A
DIVISION OF LOCKHEED CORPORA-
TION, John Thompson, Edward Gar-
ben, Robert F. Lang, George Slicho,
Ron Hudson, Bill Pope, C.H. Bankston,
Joe Doe and Richard Doe, Defendants.
Civ. A. No. C82-2061A.




Former employees brought action
against employer alleging that their dis-
charge was due to their political activities.
Employer moved for summary judgment.
The District Court, Robert H. Hall, J., held
that: (1) civil rights statute prohibiting
conspiracies to deprive persons of rights or
privileges did not reach politically-motivat-
ed conspiracies, and (2) claim that employer
breached collective bargaining agreement
by discharging employees was barred by
six-month period of limitations.
Motion granted.
I. Conspiracy s=1.7
Under civil rights statute prohibiting
conspiracies to deprive persons of rights or
privileges, requirement that accused act un-
der color of law does not mean that he must
be officer of the state. 42 U.S.C.A.
1985(3).
2. Conspiracy 41=> 7.7
Complaint alleging that employer vie-
lated civil rights statute prohibiting 4111-
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INTEREST OF PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR-APPELLANTS 
The State of Colorado is a prior-appropriation water law state which, since
Statehood in 1876, has developed and fostered a complex system for the allocation anti
administration of water rights for beneficial use. See, sg:, C.R.S., Title 37, Articles 40
through 92. The Colorado Water Conservation Board, a state agency, is authorized to
appropriate unappropriated waters for instream flow purposes, to preserve the natural
environment to a reasonable degree. C.R.S. § 37-92-1020h Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation Board, 197 Colo. 469, 594 P.2d 570
(1979). The State also maintains an active water quality control program for the
protection of beneficial uses. C.R.S. § 25-8-101, et sec. The State's Water Quality
Control Act provides that the State's water quality control laws shall not be interpreted
"so as to supersede, abrogate, or impair rights to divert water and apply water to
beneficial uses ..." C.R.S. § 25-8-104.
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, established in 1937, was
the first district to be organized under the provisions of Colorado's Water Conservancy
Act, C.R.S. § 37-45-101 et m. Conservancy districts are political subdivisions and
quasi-municipal entities of the State of Colorado created for the development of water
supplies for beneficial use. See People ex. rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P.2d
274 (1938). The boundaries of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District in
seven counties of northeastern Colorado include Colorado's front range from Boulder to
Fort Collins out to Greeley and down the South Platte River from Platteville to the State
The Lowe South Platte Water Conservancy District is, likewise, a water
conservancy district originally organized under Colorado's Water Conservancy Act. The
Lower South Platte District overlaps the boundaries of the Nortlient Coiorado Water
Conservancy District along the South Plane River east of Fort Morgan to the State
line. There are now forty-six water conservancy districts in the State of Colorado. See
C.R.S. § 37-45-153.
The Colorado River Water Conservation District is a public body corporate
created in 1937 by an Act of the Colorado Legislature, C.R.S. § 37-46-101 et sea. The
River District covers all of twelve and parts of three other counties on the western slope
of the Continental Divide. The River District, the first of the water conservation
districts established by the Colorado legislature, was created for the purpose of
developing, using, and conserving the water resources of the Colorado River and its
principal tributaries, and safeguarding for Colorado all water to which the State of
Colorado is equitably entitled under the Colorado River Compact.
The Southwestern Water Conservation District is a public body corporate
created under the laws of Colorado by the rate legislature in 1941 (C.R.S. § 37-47-101
et sec.) and comprises all of six and parts of three other counties in southwestern
Colorado. This District was formed for the purpose of conservation, use and develop-
ment of the water resources of the San Juan and Dolores Rivers and their tributaries in
southwestern Colorado.
All of these plaintiff-intervenor-appellants are governmental entities and
have a direct and substantial stake in the outcome of this lawsuit with regard to water
projects which they intend to pursue under their statutory authorities, or which water
users within their boundaries intend to pursue, in the future Each of these projects will
undoubtedly require a 404 permit from the Corps of Engineers. ..
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Did Congress intend, in section 404 of the Clean Water Act, to
authorize the United States Army Corps of Engineers to regulate the beneficial
consumptive use of water under a state-created water right?
-2-
2. Does section 7 of the Endangered Species Act empower the Corps to
regulate the exercise of a state-created water right solely because the water to be put to
beneficial consumptive use will be stored behind a dam, the construction of which
requires a permit under section 404?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We adopt the statement of facts contained in the opening brief of Riverside
Irrigation District and Public Service Company ("plaintiffs").
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case involves the proper construction of section 4 ,04 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
The issue is simply this: in determining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on a
nationwide 404 permit to discharge dredged or fill material in connection with the
construction of the Wildcat Darn and Reservoir, did the Army Corps of Engineers have
authority to impose conditions, or require the plaintiffs to obtain an individual permit,
solely because of depletion effects that will allegedly occur downstream as a result of
the exercise of plaintiffs' water right, i.e., the placing of water to beneficial
consumptive use'
In recent years, heated controversy has arisen between the western states
and various federal agencies over the extent to which Congress has intended to defer to
state authority with respect to the allocation and use of water. This controversy erupted
over the proper interpretation of section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), and again over whether water was reserved from
appropriation under state law to maintain instream flows for recreation, aesthetic, and
wildlife preservation purposes when the national forests were created, United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 6% (1978). In both cases, the Supreme Court gave careful
consideration to 'the history of congressional intent in the field of federal-state
jurisdiction with respect to allocation of water." United States v. New Mexico, supra,
438 U.S. at 701-702. That history was extensively reviewed in California v. United
States, in which the court concluded that "through it runs the consistent thread of
purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress." 438 U.S. at 653.
Now this controversy has again arisen, because the Corps asserts that
Congress, in the Clean Water Act, intended to have the Corps consider and place
conditions upon the exercise of water rights, in order to "mitigate" downstream impacts
of water depletions.
In section 101 of the Clean Water Act (commonly known as the "Wallop
Amendment") Congress stated that nothing in the Act shall be construed to "supersede,"
"abrogate," or "impair" the "authority of each state to allocate quantities of water within
its jurisdiction", or "to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have
been established by any state," 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). In light of this legislative
declaration, which reaffirmed Congress' historical policy of "cooperative federalism" in
the area of water allocation, the District Court was wrong to conclude that Congress
intended to grant the Corps authority in section 404 to regulate all "deleterious
downstream environmental effects from a project," including effects wholly attributable
to beneficial consumptive use of water, Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews,
568 F. Supp. 583, 589 (D. Colo. 1983).
The district court's complete disregard for Congressional deference to state
water allocation systems is reminiscent of a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals holding that water was a "valuable mineral" and, therefore, locatable under
federal mining laws. The United States Supreme Court promptly reversed, stating:
. .. the court below decided that "it would be incongruous
. . to hazard that Congress was not aware of the
necessary glove of water for the hand of mining." 553 F.2d
at 1216. Congress was indeed aware of this, so much
aware that it expressly provided a water rights policy in
the mining laws. But the policy is a "passive" one. . . .
Congress three times (in 1866, 1870, and 1872) affirmed
the view that private waxer rights on federal lands were to
be governed by stated and local law and custom. It defies
common sense to assume that Congress, when it adopted
this policy, meant at the same time to establish a parallel
federal system for acquiring private water rights, and that
it did so sub silentio through laws designed to regulate
mining. rain- the 1866 and 1870 provisions, the
history out of which they arose, and the decisions
construing them in the context of the 1872 law, the notion
that water is a "valuable mineral" under the law is simply
untenable.
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 614 (1978).
The district court recognized that the Endangered Species Act does not
expand the scope of the Corps' authority under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
But the court erred when it determined that the Corps may regulate the effects of
stream depletions. The 404 permit program is not a water cuantitv regulatory
program. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is triggered only by "actions"
which are "authorized," "funded," or "carried out" by federal agencies. Here the only
federal nexus is the requirement that a water crualitv permit be obtained. Since the
Corps had no authority to regulate the exercise of privately held water rights, the
Endangered Species Act simply does not reach the alleged depletive effects of the
beneficial consumptive use of water. In such circumstances, the proper way for the
federal government to provide for the conservation of an endangered species,
including its water needs, is through sections 4 and 5 of the Endangered Species Act.
I. THE ESSENCE OF RIVERSIDE'S WATER RIGHT IS TO PUT
WATER TO A BENEFICIAL CONSUMPTIVE USE, THEREBY
DEPLETING STREAM FLOW
Colorado is typical of the states of the semi-arid west, in which unique
water supply problems compelled the rejection of the riparian doctrine of water rights, in
favor of a water allocation system better suited to regional needs. See, sg:, Clark v.
Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 370 (1905).
Water law in Colorado is based upon the principal of prior appropriation
under which:
the first person who acts toward the diversion of water from a
natural stream and the application of such water to a benefi-
cial use has the first right, provided he diligently continues his
enterprise to completion and beneficially applies the water.
The rights of subsequent appropriations are subject to rights
already held in the stream.
Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Company , 304 U.S. 92, 98 (1938);
see also Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
All waters in and tributary to natural surface strearns are available for
appropriation for beneficial uses in Colorado, subject only to the prior rights of other
appropriators and compact allocations. Id.; Colo. Const. Art. XVI, Sea. 5 and 6. As the
Colorado Supreme Court has said: "The value of a water right is its priority and the
expectations which that right provides." Navajo Development Company v. Sanderson,
655 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Colo. 1982). The very essence of a water right under Colorado law
is to deplete the available supply of the steam in accordance with one's priority.
It is fundamental to the prior appropriation doctrine that one who appro-
priates water in priority may consumptively use water and is not required to provide
replacement water for junior water users. See, ear Weibert v. Rothe Brothers, 200
Colo. 310, 618 P.2d 1367 (1980). In contrast, one who wishes to divert water out of
priority must provide replacement water necessary to meet the lawful requirements of
senior appropriators. See C.R.S. §§ 37-92-103(9), 37-92-305(5), 73-92-305(8); Cache La
Poudre Water Users Assoc. v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53, 550 P.2d 288 (1976);
Kelly Rancn v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 191 Colo. 65,
550 P.2d 297 (1976).
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Water may be impounded behind a darn only under a water right which is in
priority.1/ See C.R.S. § 3747-101. At all other times, a dam must allow the stream to
flow undiminished to satisfy senior water rights downstream. See C.R.S. § 37-84-117,
§ 3747-119. Furthermore, the division engineer has the authority to order the release
from storage of any water that he finds has been illegally stored, and also to make such
orders as are necessary to insure that such released waters are delivered to the
appropriators who are entitled to them. C.R.S. § 37-92-502(3). The state engineer and
division engineer have authority to order the removal of any dam which restricts or
impedes the flow of water to water users of the state. C.R.S. § 37-92-502(7).
Riverside has obtained a decreed water right under state law which entities
it to store water in priority and put the water to beneficial consumptive use, thereby
reducing downstream flow.2/ But the United States seeks to place conditions on the
exercise of this water right — conditions which are based on the consumptive use of
water quantities, not on the impacts of the discharge of dredged or fill material.
The position of the United States in this case undermines the efforts of
Congress and the courts to resolve interstate disputes over the allocation of water. The
scarcity of water in the west has led to conflicts between the states, sometimes
culminating in litigation, over the allocation of interstate surface waters. Colorado has
been a party to several equitable apportionment adjudications. See, wg, Kansas v.
1/ An exception to this rule is that Colorado law allows water to be stored out-of-
priority where the water stored can be made promptly available to downstream senior
storage appropriators in case they are unable to obtain their entire appropriative water
supply. C.R.S. § 37-80-120(1). This maximizes the beneficial use of runoff waters that
otherwise might be lost to the State.
2/	 Riverside holds a valid, vested water right under Colorado law. See C.R.S.
37-92-103(6); C.R.S. § 37-92-301 through 306; Rocky Mountain Power Co-m-oany v.
White River Electric Association, 151 Colo. 45, 376 P.2d 158 (1962); Mooney v. Kumer,
194 Colo. 477, 479, 573 P.2d 538, 539 (1978).
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Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, modified and reht
denied, 260 U.S. 1 (1922); and, most recently, Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176
(1982).
Congress has been willing to let the states settle their differences over
water rights through mutual agreement, and the Supreme Court has encouraged them to
do so. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3446 (1981).
Accordingly, Colorado has entered into nine Congressionally-approved interstate
compacts to apportion the waters of interstate streams4/
The states of Colorado and Nebraska entered into the South Platte River
compact to apportion between themselves the right to use the full flow of the South
Platte River and its tributaries. See C.R.S. § 37-65-101. Congress ratified the compact
without qualification. 44 Stat. 195 (1926).
The South Platte River compact provides, in Article IV, that, between
October 15 of any year and the first day of April of the following year, Colorado shall
have the full and uninterrupted use and benefit of the water of the river flowing within
the boundaries of Colorado. Between April 1 and October 15 of each year, Colorado
appropriators having adjudicated dates of priority subsequent to June 14, 1897, may not
be supplied with water to an extent that will diminish the flow of the river at the
interstate station below a mean flow of 120 cubic feet of water per second of time;
Colorado water users may appropriate and use all flows in excess of this amount.
3/ The South Platte River Compact (44 Stat. 195), the Colorado River Compact
r42 Stat. 171), the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (63 Stat 31), the Amended
Castilla Creek Compact (77 Stat. 350), the Arkansas River Compact (63 Stat. 145), the
Republican River Compact (57 Stat. 86), the Rio Grande River Compact (53 Stat. 785),
the La Plata River Compact (43 Stat. 796), and the Animas-La Plata Project Compact
(82 Stat. 885). C.R.S., Title 37, articles 61 through 69.
-8-
Although the South Platte River is over-appropriated during most times of
the year, see Wadsworth v. Kuiver, 193 Colo. 95, 562 P.2d 1114 (1977), Colorado still
allows more water to flow across its border into Nebraska than is required by the
compact, mainly during spring high water conditions. This situation continues because
adequate facilities do not presently exist in Colorado to capture and store excess water,
within the compact allocation, particularly in the spring and early summer months when
flow can exceed the exercise of current rights See Wyoming v. Colorado, su pra, 259
U.S. at 458 (where the Court observed that the Cache la Poudre River, an important
tributary of the South Platte along Colorado's north front range, produces the bulk of its
water yield in the months of May, June, and July); Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 722 (1973) (for a general discussion of the
problem).
As the Colorado Supreme Court has said, it is "a basic principle of western
r irrigation that conservation and maximum usage demand the storage of water in times of
plenty for use in times of drought." A-B Cattle Company v. United States, 1% Colo.
539, 545, 589 P.2d 57, 61 (1978). The project proposed by Riverside and Public Service
Company will serve just this purpose; the reservoir will capture excess flows from snow-
melt or precipitation for application to beneficial consumptive uses in Colorado, within
Colorado's allocation under the South Platte River Compact. Now the United States
claims that it may prevent Colorado from making full use of its compact allocation if the
Fish and Wildlife Service (uFWS") perceives that Colorado water users upstream will
deplete the stream in Nebraska in a way which that agency deems unacceptable.
The Corps and National Wildlife Federation may argue that Colorado's
ability to make use of its compact allocation is not impaired. However, the first
r
	 biological opinion prepared by FWS and adopted by the Corps, which gave rise to this
lawsuit, required that certain amounts of water stored under the Wildcat Reservoir water
-9-
right must not be stored or must be released from storage into Nebraska as a condition to
utilization of the nationwide 404 permit. Administrative Record (Vol. VIII) p. 248. The
bypass or release of water was required during the spring and early summer months when
the plaintiffs would exercise the Wildcat Reservoir water right FWS said the water was
needed to "scrub" out vegetation in the river channel, so predators would not sneak up
and prey on the whooping cranes.
During proceedings in the district court, a new biological opinion appeared,
which the Corps also adopted. Administrative Record (Vol. III), p. 329. In the second
opinion, FWS concluded that it is unlikely that the Wildcat Project "could contribute in a
meaningful way" to providing "scouring flows" at the whooping crane habitat. Instead,
FWS proposed conditions involving the mechanical clearing of vegetation in Nebraska.
Administrative Record (Vol. VIII), p. 349.
Under either opinion, construction of the Wildcat Project could not proceed
under the nationwide permit unless Riverside acceded to certain conditions which are
required solely because of the alleged depletive effects of putting a water right to
beneficial consumptive use. Thus, the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404
is still the central issue of this case.
Moreover, the second biological opinion makes it clear that the Corps
intends to continue regulating the amount of consumptive use of water in the South
Platte Basin:
As we stated earlier, the size of the project and its location
relative to the crane habitat makes [sic] it unlikely that the
project could contribute in any meaningful way to help
accomplish a reorientation of the timing of the flows in the
basin. Flow releases and other comoensatina measures may be
recommended in future projects on a case by case basis as
more information becomes available.
Administrative Record (Vol. VIII), p. 350 (emphasis added).
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Every acre foot of water which a water user must bypass or release from
storage for some other use is an acre foot lost to beneficial use under his water right.
Simply put, the Corps, at the urging of FWS, intends to limit or condition the beneficial
consumptive use of water which can be made by Colorado water users and to reallocate
water uses between the states of Colored and Nebraska.
II. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND, IN SECTION 404 OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT, TO AUTHORIZE THE CORPS TO
REGULATE THE CONSUMPTIVE USE OF WATER DUE TO
THE EXERCISE OF STATE-CREATED WATER RIGHTS.
The issue here is congressional intent. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 316 n.11 (1982); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours de Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138
(1977). The history of federal-state water relations has been marked by deference TO the
states. The two most prominent instances where Congress has not deferred to the states
are the navigation servitude and the reserved rights doctrine, neither of which is involved
here. See California v. United States, supra, 438 U.S. at 662; United States v. New
Mexico, supra, 438 U.S. at 698. In enacting section 404 of the Clean Water Act,
Congress intended to defer to the states' traditional authority to allocate quantities of
water and to make consumptive use of water within their boundaries.
A. The plain language of section 404 limits the
Corps' jurisdiction to effects of discharging
dredged or fill material into the aquatic
environment; this does not include the effects of
making beneficial consumptive use of water
under a water right. 
The starting point in every case of statutory construction must be the
language of the statute itself. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981). Section 404 of
the Clean Water Act provides, in relevant part:
(a) The Secretary [of the Army] may issue permits, after
notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites....
• • •
(c) The Administrator [of the Environmental Protection
Agency] is authorized to prohibit the specification (including
the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a
disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of
any defined area for specification (including the withdrawal of
specification) as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after
notice and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge
of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable
aciverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and
fishery areas (incIiiciing spawning and breeding areas), wildlife,
or recreational areas.
• • •
(eX1) In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of
dredged or fill material under this section, the Secretary may,
after notice and opportunity for public hearing, issue general
permits on a State, regional, or nationwide basis for any
category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill
material if the Secretary determines that the activities in such
category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse 
environmental effects when performed separately, and will
have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the
environment. ...
33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), (c), (eX1) (emphasis added). The Corps has issued regulations
implementing its authority to issue nationwide permits, a key provision of the 1977 Clean
Water Act meant to streamline the permitting process. See 33 C.F.R. 323. See also
Schlauch and Strickland, "Changing Land to Water — The Alchemy of the Federal
Wetlands Regulatory Scheme," 27A Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 635, 656
(19/12).
While the plain-meaning rule may be better described as "an axiom of
experience than as a rule of law," Watt v. Alaska, suora, 451 U.S. at 266, except in "rare
and exceptional circumstances," judicial inquiry is complete when the terms of a statute
are unambiguous. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981). No rare and
exceptional circumstances are present in this case which would justify departing from
the plain meaning of the statute.
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The clear and unambiguous language of each pertinent subsection of
section 404 focuses on the adverse effects of the discharge of dredged or fill material at
a specified disposal site. For example, section 404(a) gives the Secretary of the Army
authority to issue permits for "the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites." And section 404(c) authorizes the
administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, upon complying with certain
conditions, to withdraw any defined area as a disposal site if "the discharge of such
materials into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect" on the aquatic
environment.
Nothing in section 404 purports to authorize the Secretary of the Army or
the EPA administrator to determine that a project does not qualify for a nationwide
permit where the discharge se will have no adverse environmental impact. Here, the
United States has conceded that the discharge will not create any problem; rather, the
alleged adverse effects occur when Riverside stores and makes beneficial use of water
under its water right.
B. The legislative history of section 404 shows that
Congress intended to regulate only the adverse
effects of discharges of pollutants and degrada-
tion of disposal sites. 
The legislative history of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments and the 1977 Clean Water Act demonstrates that Congress did not intend
the Corps to use section 404 to regulate the exercise of water rights.
Senator Muskie, Cprime sponsor of the 1972 and 1977 federal water quality
control legislation, summarized the scope of the 404 program as follows;
Third, prior to the issuance of any permit to dispose of spoil,
the Administrator must determine that the material to be
disposed of will not adversely affect municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and
breeding areas), wildlife or recreational areas in the specified
site. Should the Administrator so determine, no permit may
isSUe.
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The Conferees were uniquely aware of the process by
which the dredge and fill permits are presently handled and did
not wish to create a burdensome bureaucracy in light of the
fact that a system to issue permits already existed. At the
same time, the Committee did not believe there could be any
justification for permitting the Secretary of the Army to make
determination as to the environmental implications of either
the site to be selected or the specific spoil to be disposed of in
a site. Thus, the Conferees agreed that the Administrator pi
MT-Environmental Protection Agency should have the veto
over the selection of the site for dredged spoil disposal and 	 lba
over any soecific spoil to be disposed of in any selected site.
Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee, S. 2770, October 4,
1972, Vol.! 1972 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 at 177 (emphasis added) (hereinafter, 1972 Legislative History).
Plainly, Congress was concerned about site-specific, pollution-related
impacts of the placement or disposal of dredged or fill material. The 1977 Clean Water
Act Amendments did not change the scope of section 404. During the 1977 debate,
Senator Muskie read with approval a letter from Senator Bumpers which described
section 404 as a program whereby the EPA Administrator could "prohibit or restrict the
use of any disposal site for dredged or fill material if he determines that the discharge of
such materials at that site will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water
supplies" and similar values. Senate Debate on Conference Committee Report on H.R.
3199 (December 1.5, 1977), Vol. 3, A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977
at 472 (emphasis added) (hereinafter, 1977 Legislative History).
Senators Muskie, Hart, and Stafford emphasized that dredging up materials
already placed in the waters could release embedded toxic pollutants into the waterways
and that control of such releases falls within section 404. Vol. 4, 1977 Legislative
History at 908-909, 911, 928.
In the very recent case of Reid v. Marsh, 20 E.R.C. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1984),
the court considered whether section 404 was intended to regulate dredging per se, or
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was intended to regulate dredging "only to the extent that it constitutes a 'discharge of
dredged material'." Id. at 1342. Based upon the language of section 404, the legislative
history, and the remarks of commentators, the court concluded that the Corps'
jurisdiction is limited under section 404 to discharges of dredged or fill material, and
that "the Corps should evaluate only the effect of discharges resulting from dredging
activities and not the ultimate effect of proposed channel modification." Id. (emphasis
• •
added). While the court found that the dredging activities involved were subject to the
Corps' jurisdiction under section 404, it stated that "[tinis jurisdiction ... does not give
the Corps authority to regulate the actual deepening and widening of the channel (Le. the
dredging mr. se)." Id.
It is no longer subject to reasonable debate that section 404 was also
intended to protect wetlands:
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 required a permit program to control the
adverse effects caused by point source discharges of dredged
or fill material into the navigable waters including: (1) the
destruction and degradation of aquatic resources that results
from replacing water with dredged material; and (2) the
contamination of water resources with dredged or fill material
that contains toxic substances.
The committee amendment is desired to reaffirm this
intent and dispel the wide-spread fears that the program is
regulating activities that were not intended to be regulated.
S. Rep. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1977, at 74-75, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code
Cong. dc Ad. News 4326, 4399-4400 and 1977 Legislative History at 707-708 (emphasis
added).
The cases that have construed the Corps' authority to protect wetlands have
all involved the discharge of dredged or fill material into wetlands and consequent
environmental degradation in the vicinity of the disposal site. See United States v.
Fleming Plantations, 12 E.R.C. 1705 (E.D La. 1978); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657
-15-
F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981) cert. denied, 433 U.S. 1017 (1982); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League
v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. La. 1979); Bayou des Families Development Corp. v.
Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. La. 1982).
In Save Our Wetlands v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634 (5th Cit. 1983), however, the
Fifth Circuit upheld the Corps' decision not to require a 404 permit for the clearing of
trees and other vegetation in a wetland. The COI= distinguished Avoyelles on the ground
that the work contemplated in that case was more extensive and would have destroyed
the wetland, whereas the wetland in Save Our Wetlands was not going to be converted to
dryland.
As the Eighth Circuit recognized in a case which held that Congress intended
the construction of dams and the placement of riprap to come within the purview of
section 404, this permit program is also rmtended to control the degradation of aquatic
resources that results from any replacement of water with fill material." Minnehaha
Creek Watershed District v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 627 (8th Cr. 1979) (emphasis added).
This is not a wetlands case. Here the Corps asserts that section 404 can be
expanded into a general mandate to prevent or restrict downstream flow depletions
caused by the exercise of state created water rights. The language and legislative
history of section 404 refute that assertion.
C. Long-standing Congressional deference to state
water law should not be disregarded absent a
clear expression of legislative intent. 
In construing section 404 of the Clean Water Act, this Court should give
effect to the long history of federal-state relations involving the allocation of water in
the arid western states. As observed by the Supreme Court, "Where Congress has
expressly addressed the question of whether federal entities must abide by state water
Law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state law." United States v. New Mexico,
sutra, 438 U.S. at 702; See also Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., su pra. The
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basis for this deference is the unique water law which developed in the West. Clark v.
Nash, masi see also United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Company, 339 U.S. 725,
745-748 (1950).
This federal deference to state water law began with the Mining Act of
1866, 14 Stat. 251, by which Congress recognized and acknowledged the doctrine of prior
appropriation on the western public lands. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Company,
supra, 339 U.S. at 747-748. The Desert Land Act of 1377 similarly protected locally
recognized appropriative rights. 19 Stat. 377. In the case of Broder v. Natorna Water
and Mining Company, 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879), the Supreme Court pointed out that local
appropriation rights were *rights which the government had, by its conduct, recognized
and encouraged and was bound to protect..." See generall y California v. United States,
supra, and United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982), for a
recent survey of federal-state relations pertaining to water law in the west.
Further evidence of Congress' deference to state water law is to be found in
the numerous interstate compacts dealing with water that have been approved by
Congress. See Soorhase v. Nebraska, supra, 102 S. Ct. at 3466. A cornerstone of the
appropriation system is the certainty and reliability afforded by interstate compact
water allocations, upon which the states and individual water users reasonably rely.
Nothing in the Clean Water Act suggests that Congress intended to reverse
its long-standing policy of deference to state water laws systems. The Act is posited on
the commerce clause. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 375 (10th
Cir. 1979). It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that federal statutes
enacted under the commerce clause should not be interpreted to inject federal authority
into an area of traditional state control absent a "clear statement" of congressional
intent. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Rath Packing Company,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977):
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Where, as here, the field which Congress is said to have pre-
empted has been traditionally occupied by the States ... "we
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." ...
This assumption provides assurance that "the federal state
balance".., will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress
or unnecessarily by the courts.
(Citations deleted.) See also New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublin°,
413 U.S. 405, 417418 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); F.T.C. v. Bunte
Brothers, Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
This rule of deference is explained by Professor Tribe in American
Constitutional Law, § 5-8 (1978):
The Supreme Court pays particularly close heed to statutory
language and legislative history in judging the reach of laws
enacted under the commerce clauses. A law will not be held to
affect all the activities Congress can control unless statutory
language or legislative history constitutes a clear statement
that Congress intended to exercise its commerce clause power
in full.
The Supreme Court has invoked the clear statement require-
ment most notably where a judgment that a federal statute
reached to the outer limits of the commerce power would be
obviously inconsistent with state institutional interests.
(Emphasis in original.) See also Frankfurter, Some Reflections On The Reading Of
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539-540 (1947).
Congress has historically deferred to the authority of the states to control
the waters within their boundaries and to equitably apportion interstate waters by
entering into interstate compacts. This deference has been explicit and continuing.
Congress approved the South Platte River Compact, allocating the waters of that stream
between uses in Colorado and Nebraska. Congress has not clearly stated an intent to
reverse its long-standing policy and assert federal authority over a matter traditionally
subject to state regulation. Therefore, this Court should not construe section 404 of the
Clean Water Act to supplant state authority to allocate and make beneficial consumptive
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use of water resources under state law. Congress did not make a clear statement in the
Clean Water Act that the Corps should regulate the consumptive beneficial use of water
quantities; rather, Congress intended to limit the scope of the Corps' authority to the
adverse effects of discharging dredged or fill material into the aquatic environment
D. Congress enacted section 101(g) of the Clean
Water Act to ensure that the Act would not be
used to supersede or abrogate state water right
systems or state-created water rights.
As part of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress enacted
section 101(g) to expressly prohibit that Act from being interpreted or applied in a
manner which would impair state authority to allocate water under state law or which
would supersede the exercise of water rights for beneficial use under state law.
Section 10I(g) provides, in relevant part:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter.
It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities
of water which have been established by any state....
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
This amendment was co-sponsored by Senators Wallop of Wyoming and Hart
of Colorado, with the express intention of preventing the very misuse of the Clean Water
Act which has occurred here. Referring to section 101(g), the D.C. Circuit has stated,
In find specific indication in the Act that Congress did not want to interfere any more
than necessary with state water management ...." National Wildlife Federation v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
In particular, Senators Wallop and Hart were reacting to a document entitled
"Issue and Option Papers" published by the Water Resources Council shortly after
President Carter took office. Senator Wallop explained the Congressional response to
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that study, which recommended, in part, use of water quality laws as a means to require
maintenance of instream flows:
The conferees accepted an amendment which will reassure the
State that it is the policy of Congress that the Clean Water
Act will not be used for the purpose of interfering with State
water rights systems. I sponsored this amendment with
Senator Hart on the floor of the Senate. This amendment
carne immediately after the release of the Issue and ODtiOrl
Papers for the Water Resource Policy Study now being con-
ducted by the Water Resources Council. Several of the ootions
contained in that oaDer called for the use of Federal water
ouality legislation to effect Federal purposes that were not
strictly related to water quality. Those purposes mignt
include, but were not limited to, Federal land use planning,
plant siting and production planning purposes. This "State's
jurisdiction" amendment reaffirms that it is to be used for
water quality purposes only.
Senate Debate, December 15, 1977, 1977 Legislative History at 531.
The Issue and Option Papers which triggered section 101(g) appeared in the
Federal Register of July 15, 1977, and read, in part, as follows:
Problem 2. Water related laws and management prac-
tices that may impair the recognition of environmental values
include: (1) Concepts of "beneficial use" and "diversion" in
water law systems frequently have not evolved to include
instream flow needs or certain offstrearn environmental uses;
(2) Water laws in many riparian oriented States may not
provide for effective allocation of water to achieve and
protect instream flow needs; ...
Options....
4. State and local governments could be required to
adopt strategies providing for instream flow needs through
State law. Federal sanctions, through contracting, licensing
and permit woroval could be used to implement this alter-
native.
42 Fed. Reg. 36793 (1977) (emphasis added).
Thus, the Water Resources Council expressly proposed to utilize existing
federal permit authority in order to require maintenance of streamf lows. Through
101(g), Congress specifically rejected such use of the Clean Water Act. Rather,
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Congress emphasized "its intent to minimize federal control over rate decisions on
water Quantity . ..." National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, sutra, 693 F.2d at 179
(emphasis in original).
Section 101(g) did not change the law, but rather, reasserted the tradition of
deference to state water law. As Senator Wallop explained,
This amendment is not intended to create a new cause of
action. It is not intended to change present law, for a similar
prohibition is contained in section 510 of the Act.4/ This
amenciment does seek to clarify the poiicy of Congress
concerning the proper role of Federal water quality legislation
in relation to State water law. Legitimate water quality
measures authorized by this Act may at times have some
effect on the method of water usage. Water quality standards
and their upgrading are legitimate and necessary under this
Act. The requirements of section 402 and 404 permits may
incidentally effect individual water rights. Management
practices developed through state or local 208 planning units
may also incidentally affect the use of water under an indivi-
dual water right. It is not the purpose of this amendment to
prohibit those incidental effects. It is the purpose of this
amendment to insure that State allocation systems are not sub-
verted, and that effects on individual rights, if any, are
prompted by legitimate and necessary water quality considera-
tions.
This amendment is an attempt to recognize the historic
allocation rights contained in State constitutions.
It is designed to protect historic rights from mischievous
abrogation by those who would use an act, designed solely to
protect water quality and wetlands, for other purposes. It does
not interfere with the legitimate purposes for which the Act
was designed.
4 / The District Court misconstrued and misapplied section 510 of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1370. Originally placed in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act
amendments, section 510 is a State law savings clause whose intent was, inter alia, to
defer to state water quantity allocation systems. The 1977 Wallop Amendment simply
reinforced section 510 in light of the threat posed to state water law systems by the
"Issue and Option Papers." See Scott M. Matheson, "President Carter's Water Policy:
Partnership or Preemption," 25 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 1-1, 1-9 through
1-15 (1979). See also Charles B. White, "The Emerging Relationship Between
Environmental Regulations and Colorado Water Law," 53 University of Colorado Law
Review 597, 634 (1982).
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Water quality and interstate movement is an acceptable
federal role and influence. But the States historic rights to
allocate quantity, and establish priority of usage remains [sic]
inviolate because of this amendment. The Water Pollution
Control Act was designed to protect the quality of water and
to protect titical wetlands in concert with the various
states. In short a responsible federal role.
Senate Debate, December 15, 1977, 1977 Legislative History at 531-532 (emphasis
added).
Congress recognized that measures carrying out the legitimate purposes of
the Clean Water Act — protection of water quality and wetlands — could "incidentally"
affect the use of water under an individual water right. Section 101(g) was not intended
to prohibit such "incidental" effects, but to protect state water allocation systems from
"mischievous abrogation" by those who would use the Clean Water Act for purposes other
than the protection of water quality and wetlands. The Corps seeks to do exactly what
section 101 forbids — to impair the authority of the State of Colorado to allocate
quantities of water within its jurisdiction and to supersede the consumptive use which
Riverside may make under its water right.
Since federal statutes enacted under the commerce clause are not inter-
preted to inject federal authority into an area of traditional state control absent a "clear
statement" of congressional intent, it follows a fortiori that the reach of a federal
statute must be limited where, as here, the statutory language clearly suggests that
Congress stopped short of exercising what might be its full constitutional power.
L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, supra, 5-8.
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "Where a Federal agency is
authorized to invoke an overriding Federal power except in certain prescribed situations
and then to leave the problem to traditional state control, the existence of Federal
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authority to act should appear affirmatively and not rest on inference alone."
Connecticut Light and Power Comoanv v. Federal Power Commission, 324 US. 515, 532
(1945). Moreover, a declaration of policy in favor of state authority is "relevant and
entitled to respect as a guide in resolving any ambiguity or indefiniteness in the specific
provisions which purport to carry out its intent." Id. at 327.
The D.C. Circuit looked to the Wallop Amendment as a guide to
Congressional intent in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, su pra, 693 F.2d at 178-
179. This Court should do likewise.
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DOES NOT EMPOWER
THE CORPS TO REGULATE THE EXERCISE OF RIVERSIDE'S
WATER RIGHT.
A. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act does not
expand the Corps' jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act.
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act is not an independent grant of
authority to federal agencies; this section applies only to agency actions which are within
the agency's jurisdiction..
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act provides, in relevant part:
(aX2) Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary [of Interior), insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
(hereinafter in this section referred to as an "agenc y action") is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species
which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with affected States, to be critical ....
16 1.1.S.C. § 1536(aX2) (1982 Supp.) (emphasis added).
By its terms, section 7 applies only to actions "authorized, funded, or carried
out" by a federal agency. See T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978). To determine
whether the federal defendant properly relied upon section 7 of the Endangered Species
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Act in refusing to allow the plaintiffs to proceed under a' nationwide permit, it is
necessary to determine, as a threshold matter, what action, if any, was to be
"authorized, funded, or carried out" by the Corps. The court below recognized this.
Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, supra, 568 F. Supp. at 588. Its error lay in
misconstruing the scope of the Corps' authority under section 404.
As the Third Circuit stated in United States v. Sumo Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d
597 (3d Cit. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975), when considering the effect of the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and the National Environmental Policy Act on the
Corps' jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899:
It is clear that Congress intended that the Army Corps of
Engineers and the Secretary of the Army would consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service before issuing a permit for a
private dredge and fill operation .... The federal
environmental protection statutes did not, however, by 
terms enlarge the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of E.nyineers
uncier the Rivers and Haroors Appropriation ACT of 1399. If
there is no such jurisdiction environmental protection is still a
matter primarily of rate concern.
498 F.2d at 607 (emphasis added).
Unlike the Tellico Dam, T.V.A. v. Hill, su pra, the Grayrocks Dam,
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, 12 E.R.C. 1156 (D. Neb. 1978), or
Interstate Highway Route 10, National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th
Cit.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), the Wildcat Project will not be funded or carried
out by the federal government; it is a wholly private project. Therefore, section 7
applies only to the extent that the "action authorized" by the Corps could jeopardize the
whooping crane or adversely modify its critical habitat.
Clearly, the Corps, under a nationwide permit, authorizes the discharge of
dredged or fill material. Yet the Corps concedes that the discharge of dredged or fill
materials in connection with constructing the Wildcat Project will not have any adverse
effect on the whooping crane or its habitat. The only possible adverse effect stems from
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the exercise of Riverside's water right once the darn and reservoir are built and placed
into operation.
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act does not apply to private activities
of this sort. In the words of Congressman Dingell (House Manager of the 1973
amendments): "[Section 7] substantially amplifie[s] the obligation of [federal agencies] to
take steps within their power to carry out the purposes of this Act . ." 119 Cong. Rec.
42913 (December 20, 1973) (emphasis added).
In T.V.A. v. Hill the Court discussed Congressman Dingell's comments
regarding the types of agency practices which would be subject to section 7:
Congressman Dingell's discussion of Air Force practice
bombing, for instance, obviously pinpoints a particular activity
intimately related to the national defense—which a major
federal department would be obliged to alter in deference to
the strictures of § 7. A similar example is provided by the
House Committee Report:
"Under the authority of [§ 7], the Director of the Park
Service would be required to conform the practices of
his agency to the need for protecting the rapidly
avarmg stock of grizzly bears within Yellowstone
Park .. .." KR Rep. No. 93-412, p. 14 (1973).
(Emphasis added.)
437 U.S. at 186-187 (court's own emphasis).
Congress simply did not intend to control every private action which is
touched, however indirectly, by some federal connection. Most particularly, Congress
did not intend to alter the state-federal relationship concerning the allocation of water.
B. The fact that Riverside cannot exercise its water
right without constructing the Wildcat Darn does
not empower the Corps to regulate consumptive
use under the Wildcat water right.
Riverside cannot exercise its water right until the Wildcat dam and reservoir
are constructed, since the Wildcat water right is a storage right which necessarily
requires a dam and reservoir for its exercise. But the Corps cannot rely on its regulatory
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authority over one phase of a project to dictate how the project, once built, must be
operated as to consumptive use of water.
While this is not a NEPA case, the logic of certain NEPA cases is
instructive. In Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cr.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980), the coin held that the Corps' issuance of a permit to private
entities for the construction of a powerline segment did not constitute a major federal
action subject to NEPA. Despite the fact that, as a practical matter, the powerline
could not be built without the permit, the court ruled that Ifiactual or veto control.
however, must be distinguished from legal control or tenablement'." Id. at 272 (citations
omitted, emphasis added). Without legal, or statutorily-based, authority over a private
activity, an agency cannot control the activity, even though some stage of the private
project requires federal permission. As the court stated in Winnebago Tribe, an agency's
"discretion must be exercised within the scope of the agency's authority." Id.
Of particular relevance is Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 610 F.2d 322 (5th Cit.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980), in which a chemical
company wished to construct a plant requiring a discharge pipeline to carry industrial
waste into a bay. The Corps granted the company a permit to construct the pipeline,
having determined that only its construction was subject to Corps jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs argued that the Corps' environmental assessment concerning pipeline construc-
tion was inadequate because it failed to consider other environmental consequences of
the pipeline, the effluent it would carry, and the proposed plant. The Court
characterized the plaintiffs' position thusly:
[plaintiffs') argument is that but for the permit there
would be no pipeline; without the pipeline there would
be no excretion; without the ability to excrete the plant
would suffocate in its own waste. They argue that the
permit "enables" the plant to exist and therefore the
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entire plant should be taken into consideration in
whether or not the pipeline construction permit should
be issued.
Id. at 327. The court refused to find that the Corps' 404 permit process extended so far,
or that NEPA expanded the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction:
"NEPA must be read in context of other language in the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act .. " which places
control of water pollution caused by discharges of
effluent in the hands of the states and the EPA.
[T]he issuance of the Corps' permit was not a sufficient
nexus between the Corps and construction of the
DuPont plant to make the Corps a partner in such
construction and thereby 'federalize' the construction of
the DuPont plant."
Id. at 326 (citations omitted). See also Atlanta Coalition on the Transportation Crisis,
Inc. v. Atlanta Regional Commission, 599 F.2d 1333, 1346 (5th Cir. 1979); NAACP V.
Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1978); Edwards v. Bank of Dundee, 534 F.2d
1242, 1246 (7th dr. 1976); Weintraub v. Rural Elcification Association 457 F. Supp.
78, (M.D. Pa. 1978).
In Weintraub, an Historic Preservation Act case, the court said that:
Congress ... only intended to control direct federal spending
for actions or projects which would otherwise destroy buildings
on the National Register. Congress did not intend to reach
every effect of federal spending.
457 F. Supp. at 91. The court specifically rejected a statutory interpretation which
would have required a "detailed and elaborate tracing of the effects" of the federal
action which was "remotely caused three or four stages down the line" by federal funding
or a federal loan. Id.
In contrast, the urban renewal project requiring the demolition of a Register
property in Save the Courthouse Committee v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
involved both federal funding and ongoing federal supervision. The court found that since
the agency had ongoing responsibility for the project, Preservation Act requirements
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applied. Accord, Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 551 F.2d 1178, 1181-1182
(10th Cu. 1977) ("continuing responsibility of the federal agency" constituted agency
action).
NEPA and Historic Preservation Act cases indicate the importance of
analyzing art agency's statutory authority in determining precisely the boundaries of a
federal "action." The phrase *action authorized" in section 7 of the Endangered Species
ACT should he interpreted to refer solely to that which the Corps is authorized by
section 404 of the Clean Water Act to regulate; . it should not be construed to encompass
activities beyond the Corps' jurisdiction.
Most recently, in Reid v. Marsh, suora, 20 E.R.C. at 1344, the district court
stated that "NEPA does not require that the Corps consider areas of the project which
are not subject to its regulatory jurisdiction in its determination of whether to issue an
E.I.S. ... On remand the Corps should consider all aspects of the project falling under
its jurisdiction in its environmental assessment."
Since the exercise of Riverside's water right does not require authorization
by any federal agency, and since the activity to be authorized by the Corps — the
discharge of dredged or fill material in connection with construction of the Wildcat
Project — is not alleged to jeopardize the whooping crane or adversely modify its critical
habitat, section 7 of the Endangered Species Act does not empower Colonel Andrews to
prevent construction of the Wildcat Project under the nationwide 404 permit.
C. Prior Endangered Species Act cases all involved
federal agency action that potentially affected
an endangered species or its critical habitat.
All of the Endangered Species Act cases decided to date have involved
substantial action by a federal agency; none has construed section 7 to apply to private
conduct. T.V.A. v. Hill, sutra, concerned the Tellico Darn and Reservoir Project which
was being built by T.V.A., a wholly owned public corporation of the United States. Not
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only was the project federally authorized and funded, it was to be operated by T.V.A.,
which itself stood ready to close the gates of Tellico Dam and thereby "carry out" the
action that would inundate the critical habitat of the snail darter, located behind the
dam. 437 U.S. at 173.
Similarly, in National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, suora, Interstate
Highway Route 10 (1-10), a section of which was to transect the critical habitat of an
endangered subspecies of Sandhill Crane, was 90 percent federally financed and was
being built by a state highway department "in conjunction with and pursuant to
authorization by the Federal Highway Administration." 529 F.2d at 362. The Fifth
Circuit, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of NWFs lawsuit, stated, "The relevant
consideration is the total impact of the highway on the crane." Id. at 373. The "total
impact of the highway" included both the "direct" effects of construction of the highway
and excavation of borrow pits and the "indirect effects of residential and commercial
development that could be expected to result from the construction of the highway. Id.
The court found that the federal agency controlled the private development "to the
extent that they control the placement of the highway and interchanges." Id. at 374. In
the Coleman case, unlike this one, the federal agency controlled the purse strings, and
with them the placement of the highway and interchanges; agency decisions that were
clearly within its jurisdiction would, therefore, also control the accompanying private
development.
In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cit. 1980), the issue
was not direct versus indirect effects. The issue was whether, in evaluating outer
continental shelf lease sales under section 7, the Secretary of Interior could use a
*segmented approach," in which he considered the effects of the lease sale itself, rather
than the entire project. Id. at 608. Noting that "the lease sale itself is only a
preliminary and relatively self-contained rage within an overall oil and gas development
program which requires substantial approval and review prior to implementation of each
of the major stages: leasing, exploring, producing," the court determined that the
segmented approach complied with the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 593. The lesson
of North Slooe is that when a federal agency retains control of a multi-stage project for
its duration, the agency can limit section 7 consultation to the particular stage under
consideration, since it will be required to evaluate future stages when they are
• •
proposed. See also Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712
(1st Cir. 1979). Unlike North Slope, this case does not involve a project over which the
federal government will exercise continuing supervision. Riverside requires a single
404 permit to discharge dredged or fill material; the future diversion, storage, and
consumptive use of water under the Wildcat water right will not require federal
authorization.
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., su pra, another case involving the
impact of a darn and reservoir on the whooping crane's critical habitat in Nebraska, was
vacated upon stipulation of the parties. That case differed from this one in several
important respects. First, the plaintiffs challenged both the REA's decision to make
certain commitments and loan guarantees to the project sponsors and the Corps' issuance
of a 404 permit for construction of the Grayrocks Darn. REA's financial commitment to
the project appears to have been sufficient to "federalize" the entire project for purposes
of the Endangered Species Act. Second, the Corps simply never questioned that, because
construction of the Grayrocks Dam required a 404 permit, it was required to consider the
effects of downstream depletions on the whooping crane and its habitat; instead the
Carps argued that it had fulfilled its duty under section 7. Therefore, the district court
never considered the question whether the Corps has jurisdiction to regulate the
beneficial consumptive use of water under a water right established by state law.
Moreover, the decision will not set any precedents, since it was vacated.
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D. Although section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act cannot be used to regulate the exercise of
Riverside's water right, Congress provided other
mechanisms by which federal agencies can and
should protect the whooping crane's habitat, as
necessary.
The defendants seek to use section 7 of the Endangered Species Act to
compel holders of water rights to forego, bypass, or release quantities of water to which
they are entitled under state law, or to perform or pay for other conservation measures
to "offset" impacts of benefiri a 1 consumptive use, solely because the construction of a
dam and water storage structure initially requires a 404 permit. The defendants have
created a needless and destructive conflict between the water laws of Colorado and the
South Platte River Compact, on the one hand, and the Clean Water Act and Endangered
Species Act, on the other.
The conflict is needless because, while Congress did not intend that
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, in combination with section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, would be utilized to regulate consumptive use of water by non-federal
entities, Congress created other statutory mechanisms by which federal agencies can
protect an endangered species and its habitat.
Under section 4(f) of the Endangered Species Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(f), the Secretary "shall develop and implement plans ... for the conservation and
survival of endangered species." The term "conservation" is defined in 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(3), to include "all activities associated with scientific resources management,"
including "habitat acquisition and maintenance."
Section 5(a) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a), again states that the Secretary
"shall establish and implement a program to conserve fish, wildlife, and plants." See also
Section 7(aX1) of the Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(aX1). To carry out such a
conservation program, the Secretary is authorized by section 5 to wactruire by Purchase,
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donation, or otherwise, lands, waters, or interests therein," 16 U.S.C. § 1534(aX2)
(emphasis added). Thus, for example, the federal condemnation power can be used to
acquire water to maintain the critical habitat of an endangered species:
Even in those cases in which state cooperation is not
forthcoming the federal government is not powerless to
protect a species, as the Act authorizes the federal govern-
ment to exercise its powers of condemnation for the purpose of
acquiring whatever land or water is reasonably necessary to
protect the endangered species and its habitat.
Comment, "Federal Protection of Instrearn Values," 57 Nebraska Law Review 368, 390
(1978).5/
While section 7 cannot be used to regulate the exercise of Riverside's state-
created water right, the Endangered Species Act provides other means to protect the
whooping crane and its habitat, means that the federal government has thus far failed to
employ. What is missing for the whooping cane is a conservation program by which, if
water quantities are truly needed, the Secretary utilizes his authority under section 5 to
acquire water for the benefit of the habitat, as Congress intended. If the responsible
federal agencies were required to quantify and acquire that amount of water that is truly
needed for conservation of the whooping crane, through appropriation, purchase,
condemnation, or creation of a federal reserved water right for protection of an
endangered species, as in Cabpaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (involving the
"Desert Pupfish"), surely all non-flow alternatives, such as habitat clearing, would be
5/ The District Court misconstrued and misapplied the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act with
regard to regulation of water rights. Contrary to the District Court's suggestion that
"federal police power" prevents the development and exercise of water rights in a stream
segment which is designated under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the ACT provides that
water rights "which are vested under state law at the time of designation under the Acta
shall be compensated for, to the extent they cannot be exercised because of the
designation. See 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b).
-32-
employed by the agencies first, since the true value of the water resource in the
marketplace of water rights would become apparent.
Designation of the whooping crane habitat occurred in 1978. 43 Federal
Register 20938 (Monday, May 15, 1978). In this Federal Register notice, FWS disclaimed
that that designation would have any effect on private rights, yet the agency proceeded
not long thereafter to commence the regulation of private water rights for the benefit of
the crane's habitat. FWS and the Corps looked at habitat clearance as the sole measure
to be required of Riverside only after this lawsuit had arisen and after this Court had
issued its opinion in Riverside Irrigation District v. Stioo, 658 F.2d 762 (1981).
Meanwhile, the Wildcat Project has been held hostage to the Corps' expanded view of its
jurisdiction.
The current attempt to rely on section 7 consultations, triggered solely by
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, masks the federal government's failure to use
wildlife management tools which are compatible with state water law systems, as con-
templated by sections 4 and 5 of the Endangered Species Act.
The question is not whether the whooping crane should be protected, but
whether Congress intended that state systems of water allocation, and individual water
rights arising under those systems, should be superseded in order to do so, and whether
water users can be required to assume the federal agencies' responsibility to carry out or
fund wildlife conservation programs.
CONCLUSION
The law of this case is simple and straightforward. Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act does not authorize Col. Andrews to regulate the consumptive use of water to
be made under a privately held water right. Since the only "action" properly subject to
federal "authorization," as contemplated under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act,
-33-
is the approval of discharges of dredged or fill material, and since the Corps and FWS
have conceded that these discharges will not jeopardize the whooping crane or adversely
modify its critical habitat, Col. Andrews was not empowered to prevent the plaintiffs
from proceeding to construct Wildcat Darn and Reservoir under the nationwide
404 permit.
The Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the South Platte
River Compact must all be given effect and construed harmoniously, if possible. Such
harmony can be achieved, but only by concluding that the Corps may not impose
conditions, restrictions, or limitations on the exercise of Riverside's water right, so as to
prevent its full beneficial consumptive use of water or to extract some payment or
offsetting measures in view of that consumptive use.
The judgment of the district court should be reversed and judgment entered
for the plaintiffs.
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